The 4E approach to cognition—embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended—challenges traditional views by asking whether these features merely influence mental phenomena or actually constitute them. The authors argue that the standard metaphysical understanding of constitution (X is necessary for P in all possible worlds) is no longer tenable. They also emphasize that the role of mental representations is a separate question from that of the 4E features. This introduction sets the stage for a multi-section exploration of how these features reshape thinking about the mind, outlining the importance of each section for the ongoing debate.
The chapter examines empirical findings on false-belief understanding, which have been central to debates about social cognition. Proponents of 4E cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) challenge the traditional mindreading view that social cognition primarily involves inferring others' mental states to predict behavior. The author critiques both the philosophical interpretation and experimental designs of false-belief studies from a 4E perspective, then proposes an alternative interpretation inspired by predictive processing. This alternative is assessed for compatibility with core 4E insights, suggesting that social cognition may be more about dynamic interaction than mental state attribution.