Synthese
January 1, 2018
Shaun Gallagher, Micah Allen
221 citations
Three philosophical views on predictive models in neuroscience are distinguished: predictive coding, which relies on internal Bayesian models and prediction error minimization; predictive processing, linked to radical connectionism and simple embodiment; and predictive engagement, aligned with enactivist approaches to cognition. The concept of active inference is examined under each model, and its implications for social cognition are explored. The authors consider Frith and Friston's proposal for a neural hermeneutics and contrast it with an enactivist hermeneutics, offering an alternative account of how social understanding might work.
Cambridge University Press eBooks
October 31, 2023
Shaun Gallagher
171 citations
Contemporary theories of embodied cognition, known as the '4Es' (embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive cognition), offer diverse approaches to understanding the mind, its relation to the brain, perception, mental representation, sense making, environmental roles, and social cognition. These views contrast with classic cognitivism, and the Element examines their strengths and weaknesses, major criticisms, and possible resolutions. It focuses on enactive theory and the prospects for integrating enactive approaches with other embodied and extended theories, mediated through recent developments in predictive processing and the free energy principle. The Element concludes with a brief discussion of practical applications of embodied cognition.
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition
October 9, 2018
Albert Newen, Shaun Gallagher, Leon De Bruin
129 citations
The 4E approach to cognition—embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended—challenges traditional views by asking whether these features merely influence mental phenomena or actually constitute them. The authors argue that the standard metaphysical understanding of constitution (X is necessary for P in all possible worlds) is no longer tenable. They also emphasize that the role of mental representations is a separate question from that of the 4E features. This introduction sets the stage for a multi-section exploration of how these features reshape thinking about the mind, outlining the importance of each section for the ongoing debate.
International journal of clinical and health psychology : IJCHP
January 1, 2023
Fabio Giommi, Prisca R Bauer, Aviva Berkovich-Ohana et al.
70 citations
Rigidity, or inflexibility, is a core feature of transdiagnostic processes underlying many mental health disorders. The pattern theory of self (PTS) defines the self as a dynamic, nonlinear pattern of multiple interacting processes. Mindfulness-Based Interventions (MBIs) can reduce rigid, habitual self-patterns, thereby improving mental health. MBIs alter psychological and behavioral aspects of the self-pattern and can shift the entire self-pattern as a gestalt. Neuroscientific evidence shows that the phenomenology of the self is reflected in cortical networks, and meditation alters these networks. Combining PTS and neuroscientific findings may deepen understanding of psychopathology and improve diagnosis and treatment.
Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2020
Kevin J Ryan, Shaun Gallagher
61 citations
Ecological psychology and enactivism both hold that much of cognition can be explained without invoking internal representations, focusing instead on the dynamic coupling between an agent and the world. Yet the brain clearly plays a role. This paper explores the concept of resonance as a non-representational alternative to the brain's traditional role as a representational organ. It reviews two historical approaches to resonance—representational and non-representational, dynamic—and applies them to a case study of standard tonal jazz performance. The authors propose that a non-representational resonance account, consistent with both ecological psychology and enactivism, offers a viable explanation for jazz performance and suggest future research on the brain as a resonant organ.
Frontiers in Psychology
September 21, 2017
Shaun Gallagher
59 citations
The author defends a phenomenological account of the sense of ownership as part of a minimal sense of self against deflationary and eliminativist critiques. They argue that the phenomenological account is itself deflationary because it treats the sense of ownership as implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action. Against eliminativism, the author cites empirical evidence supporting pre-reflective self-awareness, which underlies the sense of ownership. Finally, they respond to the claim that phenomenology lacks a positive account by showing how the sense of ownership functions within an enactivist, action-oriented view of embodied cognition.
Frontiers in human neuroscience
January 1, 2013
Patricia Bockelman, Lauren Reinerman-Jones, Shaun Gallagher
47 citations
Neurophenomenology merges objective measurements, such as EEG, with first-person reports of experience to study consciousness while retaining the statistical rigor of cognitive science. A review of a baseline study identifies three key improvements for future research: building shared mental models across interdisciplinary teams, maintaining high experimental standards for control and replicability, and refining phenomenological interviews so the interviewer actively guides the interaction with the subject. These enhancements aim to advance understanding of cognition and experience.
Mindfulness
August 1, 2024
Aviva Berkovich‐ohana, Kirk Warren Brown, Shaun Gallagher et al.
22 citations
A selfless state of consciousness, reported for centuries in wisdom traditions, involves both temporary and lasting conditions. In psychology, the healthy self is typically emphasized, and the idea of selfless modes is sometimes dismissed, hindering empirical progress. This paper offers an interdisciplinary conceptual discussion grounded in the pattern theory of self (PTS), which views the self as a complex pattern of dynamically related processes. It proposes that meditative practices induce a reorganization of the self-pattern, enabling temporary or persistent selfless experience. The authors present a heuristic model, the pattern theory of selflessness (PTSL), with six nonlinear transformations: consolidating and integrating the self-pattern; cultivating concentration and present-moment awareness; cultivating mindful awareness; self-deconstruction states; self-flexibility; and self-liberation as a trait. This integrative view advances understanding of non-self experience and guides empirical research.
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition
October 9, 2018
Shaun Gallagher
20 citations
After reviewing disagreements about embodied cognition (EC) as a research field, the author distinguishes weak EC, which focuses on brain-based body-related representations, from strong EC, which treats the extraneural body and environment as more central to cognition. Weak EC relies on the neural reuse hypothesis, but the author argues that properly understanding neural reuse actually supports a stronger conception of EC. In this view, extraneural factors—including the body and physical, social, and cultural environments—play essential roles in evolutionary and developmental time frames by constraining how neural reuse works.
Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2024
Anya Daly, Rosa Ritunnano, Shaun Gallagher et al.
17 citations
Mental disorders involve complex alterations of the self that arise from interactions among cognitive, bodily, affective, social, narrative, cultural, and normative elements. The pattern theory of self (PTS) provides a non-reductive account consistent with embodied-enactive cognition and phenomenological psychopathology, emphasizing the multi-dimensionality of subjects and situated embodiment. This article develops the Examination of Self Patterns (ESP), a flexible methodological framework that front-loads the self-pattern into a minimally structured phenomenological interview. The ESP avoids internalist or externalist assumptions about mind and is guided by person-specific interpretations rather than diagnostic categories, offering advantages for tackling the complexity of mental health research and clinical protocols.
JoLMA
December 9, 2020
Mia Burnett, Shaun Gallagher
17 citations
A review of 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive) approaches to art and aesthetic experience argues that extended mind analyses focusing on tool use overlook important aspects. To account for the wide range of aesthetic experiences across diverse artistic genres, four or more E's are needed. The authors develop an enactive, affordance-based approach to understanding art and aesthetic experience, while acknowledging both the potential and limitations of any single framework. They conclude that no unified set of principles can make sense of all art everywhere.
Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2023
Shaun Gallagher
13 citations
The concept of minimal self-consciousness, a basic form of first-person pre-reflective self-awareness tied to bodily awareness and phenomenal experience, is central to discussions of sense of ownership, agency, Buddhist no-self, the Rubber Hand Illusion, and schizophrenia. However, the concept lacks clear definition. To clarify it, this paper revisits Avicenna's 11th-century Flying Man thought experiment, which isolates self-awareness from sensory input. The paper then reviews contemporary debates on the minimal self, focusing on the roles of bodily and social processes.
Oxford Scholarship Online
August 24, 2017
Shaun Gallagher
12 citations
An enactivist approach to the mind goes beyond action and sensory-motor processes, incorporating affectivity and intersubjectivity. Affectivity in a broad sense—including hunger, fatigue, pain, respiration, and emotion—influences perception, attention, and judgment, as shown by empirical studies. Intersubjective factors such as bodily postures, movements, gestures, gaze, facial expressions, and dynamic interactions similarly affect cognition. This richer embodied view also has implications for understanding brain function.
Healthcare (Basel, Switzerland)
February 13, 2021
Zuzanna Rucińska, Thomas Fondelli, Shaun Gallagher
11 citations
Imagination and metaphor understanding in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are often seen as deficits within a standard linguistic framework. This paper argues instead for an embodied and enactive account, which views imagination and metaphor as grounded in bodily interaction and lived experience. A case study from a systemic therapeutic session with a child with ASD illustrates how metaphors emerge through embodied engagement. The authors conclude that this perspective reveals previously overlooked imaginative strengths in children with ASD and suggests interactive interventions—such as those involving physical movement and shared activities—to support metaphor comprehension and imaginative skills.
The journal of pain
May 2, 2025
Peter Stilwell, Mael Gagnon-Mailhot, Anne Hudon et al.
8 citations
Pain-related suffering can occur through an immediate, disruptive impact on one's sense of self, even without self-reflection. Interviews with 12 adults across Canada living with various pain conditions revealed that during their worst pain episodes, the experience overwhelmed thoughts and self-reflective capacities, disrupting foundational aspects of self-experience such as agency, bodily ownership, and time. Participants described these experiences as incapacitating, dehumanizing, and dissociating. The accounts closely resemble first-hand reports of torture, supporting a new mode of pain-related suffering that does not require self-reflection. This expands traditional understandings, which have exclusively anchored suffering to self-reflective thought, to include two inter-related modes.
Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2025
Matteo Laurenzi, Antonino Raffone, Shaun Gallagher et al.
4 citations
The self in non-human animals is often studied in a limited, dichotomous way that separates low-level bodily and affective aspects from high-level cognitive ones. A proposed framework based on the Pattern Theory of Self (PTS) treats the self as a dynamic, multidimensional construct with graded, non-hierarchical dimensions—ranging from bodily and affective to intersubjective and normative. This approach accommodates variability within and across species, allowing researchers to investigate how the self emerges in different degrees and forms shaped by ecological niches and adaptive demands, without relying on anthropocentric biases.
Minds and Machines
November 11, 2025
Sara Incao, Alessandra Sciutti, Shaun Gallagher
2 citations
Human experience of self and time is not just about memory; it is a continuous, prereflective structure that underpins perception, intention, and action. Drawing on Husserl's phenomenology and predictive processing, this article argues that this intrinsic temporality—the retentional-protentional dynamic—can be adapted to improve cognitive architectures for humanoid robots. By modeling this temporal continuity, robots could gain greater context-awareness and autonomy, moving beyond simple memory to a more fluid sense of self and identity over time.
Continental Philosophy Review
May 25, 2026
Shaun Gallagher
The concept of sedimentation from phenomenology bridges embodied-enactive theories of habit with how habits and routines shape social practices and institutions. Institutional economics recognizes that institutions shape individual and social habits but says little about how individual habits evolve into institutions. Sedimentation provides a fuller account of these interrelations. Sedimented habits can be structurally rigid and difficult to change, yet they are performatively flexible and adaptive in situated action. This performative flexibility reflects principles of transactional plasticity that extend to institutions.
Oxford Scholarship Online
August 24, 2017
Shaun Gallagher
A range of embodied cognition (EC) theories are mapped, from 'weak EC'—which retains traditional cognitivist ideas by focusing on body-formatted representations and neural reuse—to functionalist extended-mind proposals, a biological model, and enactivist views. Each approach is examined alongside supporting empirical evidence. The chapter argues that weak EC's representationalist view of brain function is incompatible with more radical EC theories, which reconceive the brain as part of a dynamic brain–body–environment system.