Topics in cognitive science
October 1, 2012
Julian Kiverstein
72 citations
Philosophers of embodied cognitive science disagree on the meaning of embodiment. The debate centers on whether the field can retain the computer theory of mind. One view, body functionalism, sees the body as linking external problem-solving resources with internal biological machinery, supporting computational circuits that realize cognition. Body enactivism argues that no computational account can explain the role of commonsense knowledge in everyday practical engagement. The author attempts a reconciliation of these opposing views.
Topics in cognitive science
January 1, 2017
Pete Mandik
20 citations
Color illusions are best explained by high-level, conceptualized knowledge about object identity, lighting conditions, and material composition, not by nonconceptual mental intermediaries called color sensations. The author argues against philosophical views that posit such sensations between the stimulus and perceptual judgment. These illusions do not require appealing to nonconceptual mental links in the causal chain leading to conceptualized color discriminations.
Topics in cognitive science
November 27, 2023
Joanna Rączaszek-leonardi
7 citations
Ecological psychology, enactivism, and interactivism have the potential to transform perspectives on cognition and action by restoring their relevance to humans as persons. However, neither the mainstream information-processing approach nor the dynamics-oriented perspective explains how human language and symbolic thought arise from continuous agent-environment interaction. Treating dynamical and computational hypotheses as mutually exclusive leads to reductionism that hinders this challenge. Complementary descriptions, as proposed by Michael Polanyi and Howard Pattee, are needed to understand that cognizing systems are governed by both physical laws and emergent historical constraints. Some proposed solutions may ease the tension between these approaches and improve understanding of their interrelation.
Topics in cognitive science
July 2, 2026
Kristina Šekrst
Fungal mycelial networks display minimal cognition through memory-integrated adaptive regulation. Memory is defined as the capacity to modulate behavior based on past environmental interactions without requiring neural substrates or symbolic representations. Four criteria for minimal cognition are proposed: feedback-guided behavior regulation, maintenance of internal viability, structural modulation from past interactions, and plasticity enabling anticipatory adaptivity. Empirical evidence shows fungi meet all criteria: directional regrowth toward previously encountered resources after displacement, stress priming across cell divisions, directional persistence in constrained environments, and transgenerational memory via spore imprinting. These findings challenge representationalist assumptions, showing cognition can emerge from morphodynamic, biochemical, and electrophysiological processes in radically different material substrates.