Consciousness and cognition
October 1, 2016
Harry Haroutioun Haladjian, Carlos Montemayor
Phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines, despite advances in artificial intelligence that aim to reproduce human perception, cognition, and emotions. While ethical behavior may be programmable through rules and machine learning, emotions and empathy will remain simulations, not genuine experiences. Arguments from evolution, neuropsychology of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness in humans support this claim. The authors conclude that artificial consciousness is far from achievable.
Consciousness and cognition
May 1, 2014
Jean-Arthur Micoulaud-Franchi, Clélia Quiles, Guillaume Fond et al.
A methodological framework for analyzing the relationship between cognitive processes and brain activity uses variables measured by neurofeedback (NF) with functional Magnetic Resonance Imagery (fMRI NF). Two traditional approaches, the neuropsychological (NP) and psychophysiology (PP) approaches, treat cognitive or brain variables as dependent or independent. The article suggests that NF can be inspired by neurophenomenology, because fMRI NF lets participants simultaneously experience their own cognitive processes and observe effects on brain region activations. Implementing the elicitation interview method could improve fMRI NF by collecting participants' introspective reports on subjective experiences.
Consciousness and cognition
September 1, 2009
Vincent De Gardelle, Jérôme Sackur, Sid Kouider
People often believe they see more than they can report, such as all letters in a briefly flashed array. This study tested whether that feeling reflects genuine rich conscious experience or an illusion. Using a partial-report task with unexpected pseudo-letters in unreported areas, participants still perceived only letters, even though pseudo-letters were present. The results suggest the feeling of seeing arises from an illusion: the brain reconstructs letters from partial information and prior expectations, rather than from access to a rich phenomenal experience. This supports the view that the subjective richness of perception is not a direct reflection of conscious content but a constructive process.
Consciousness and cognition
June 1, 1998
T C Dalton
A local neural network model for phenomenal experience explains the persistence, latency, and seamlessness of consciousness and its unity, but fails to account for nonlinear interactions between local and global neural systems. The model's assumptions that experience is immediate, intrinsic, and incorrigible limit understanding of how consciousness changes during neurobehavioral development. Recent evidence indicates development is discontinuous and that judgment arises under uncertainty, aligning feeling and perception with energy and behavior. A developmental approach may resolve the paradox of feeling both infinitely close to and distant from oneself.
Consciousness and cognition
March 1, 2003
Josef Perner, Zoltán Dienes
Children likely become consciously aware of events in the world between 12 and 15 months of age, with a possible range of plus or minus 3 months. This conclusion emerges from evaluating five strategies: three look for signs of verbal communication, executive control, or explicit memory—activities that require conscious awareness in adults; two consider when children can engage in the minimal higher-order thought needed for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. The answer is tentative, based on converging evidence from these different approaches.