Cognitive neuroscience
January 1, 2016
Georg Northoff
213 citations
The self is often thought of as a high-level cognitive function, but this paper argues that self-specificity is a fundamental feature of the brain's spontaneous activity, particularly in cortical midline structures. Evidence shows overlap between resting-state activity and self-related processing in these regions, and resting-state patterns can predict later degrees of self-specificity. The author proposes the basis model, which conceives self-specificity as basic rather than higher-order, linking it to emotions, reward, and perception. This spontaneous self-specificity may provide a foundation for coding the self as subject in relation to internal or external mental events, connecting self-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.
Cognitive neuroscience
January 1, 2021
Johannes J. Fahrenfort, Simon van Gaal
10 citations
A functionalist criterion for arbitrating between theories of consciousness is not theory-neutral because it focuses on functional equivalence between systems. Empirical theories of consciousness are mechanistic rather than functionalist, so such criteria are not helpful for arbitration.
Cognitive neuroscience
January 1, 2021
Yair Pinto, Timo Stein
7 citations
The paper argues that the approach of setting aside the hard problem of consciousness—the question of why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experience—to focus only on measuring neural and functional correlates is not feasible. While some researchers advocate 'shut up and measure' as a pragmatic strategy, the authors contend that any data collection about consciousness necessarily involves an implicit or explicit stance on the hard problem itself. Thus, the hard problem cannot be bypassed through purely empirical methods.
Cognitive neuroscience
September 1, 2010
Antti Revonsuo, Mika Koivisto
3 citations
Event-related brain potential (ERP) evidence supports two key ideas in Lamme's theory of consciousness. The earliest brain signal linked to visual consciousness appears over the back of the head about 100-200 milliseconds after a stimulus is presented, consistent with recurrent processing in visual cortex. This early signal is largely separate from later brain responses that reflect selective attention and working memory. The findings suggest that phenomenal consciousness of a visual stimulus arises before access consciousness, and that attention and awareness rely on different neural processes.
Cognitive neuroscience
January 1, 2023
Paul Sopcak
2 citations
A commentary on Willems' neurocognitive model for mixed and ambiguous emotions and morality offers three suggestions. First, an atheoretical approach may inadvertently adopt limitations from dominant paradigms and neglect the need for theoretical guidance in developing valid emotion constructs. Second, a dynamical systems theory of emotions, paired with neurophenomenology as a methodology, provides a more fruitful framework. Third, integrating insights from the humanities, particularly on literary moral emotions, would strengthen Willems' objectives.
Cognitive neuroscience
January 1, 2024
Guy Dove
1 citation
A commentary argues that the embodied cognitive neuroscience approach proposed by Mougenot and Matheson can help resolve internal tensions within 4E cognition (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended). The approach combines embodied cognition with mechanistic explanation, offering benefits beyond general theoretical robustness—it specifically addresses conflicts among 4E frameworks without requiring neuroscientific reductionism or complete autonomy of psychology from neuroscience.
Cognitive neuroscience
January 1, 2021
J Kevin O'Regan
1 citation
A critique argues that Doerig et al. assessed how empirical theories address access consciousness but overlooked their treatment of phenomenal consciousness, likely because most theories do not address phenomenal consciousness. The sensorimotor theory is an exception, yet Doerig et al. failed to evaluate it as a theory of phenomenal consciousness.