The paper questions whether non-inferential intuitions about the problem of consciousness—those that supposedly arise before philosophical argument—actually exist. The author argues that judgments problematizing consciousness are heavily entangled with theoretical concepts and plagued by polysemy (ambiguity of words). Through analysis of terms like phenomenal consciousness, impossibility, and physicality, the paper shows a significant theoretical gap between everyday and philosophical concepts. Some everyday concepts have low semantic isolation, making them vulnerable to polysemy and misunderstanding by laypeople. Consequently, for a layperson to correctly understand and apply problem intuitions, they must be introduced to an appropriate theoretical context, which violates the condition of non-inferentiality.
The metaphor of the Book of Nature shifts from a catoptric (mirror-based) to a haptic (touch-based) model of perception. Tracing biblical and medieval origins, the article examines symbolic and theological frameworks that cast nature as a divine mirror. Francis Bacon conceived nature as a legible system of signs, influenced by kabbalistic motifs and the catoptric paradigm. In contrast, George Berkeley’s immaterialist epistemology reinterprets nature as a medium of divine communication through touch rather than reflection, pointing toward a sensory theology grounded in embodied perception.