European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
October 26, 2021
A. Aftab, Kristopher Nielsen
22 citations
The biopsychosocial model, originally proposed by Engel, was more concerned with psychosocial influences on illness experience—such as how patients interpret symptoms, adopt sick roles, seek care, and interact with doctors—than with the ontological nature of psychosocial causes. This article argues that Bolton and Gillett's reconceptualization focuses too narrowly on causal interactions between biological, psychological, and social factors. Comparing their account with an enactivist approach to mental disorder reveals that Bolton and Gillett incorporate elements of 4E cognition but combine them with an information-processing paradigm, whereas a fuller enactive account avoids reliance on information-processing altogether.
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
April 15, 2024
Diane O’leary
4 citations
After nearly fifty years of revisions, the biopsychosocial model remains philosophically incoherent, particularly regarding dualism. A recent philosophical defense by Bolton and Gillett overlooks this inconsistency, which has clinical consequences. The author argues that the model's core insight—holism—can be preserved by recognizing the reality of human experience and its biological, psychological, and social dimensions. Engel's original idea is best understood as accepting phenomenal consciousness within medical science. This reframing does not fully resolve medicine's stance on dualism but positions it clearly enough to improve patient care.
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
August 26, 2024
3 citations
Panpsychism holds that consciousness is a fundamental feature of all physical matter, but it struggles with the subject combination problem: whether and how individual subjects of experience can combine into a larger subject. This paper clarifies the real nature of that problem by analyzing a debate between Siddharth and Miller about the phenomenal bonding solution. It argues that many proposed solutions misunderstand the threat. The author evaluates defenses of subject composition and concludes that the combination problem remains unresolved.
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
April 15, 2024
S Siddharth
3 citations
Panpsychism claims that all fundamental physical entities have phenomenal consciousness, but it faces the combination problem: how micro-experiences combine into the unified experiences of larger beings like humans. A key part of this problem is the subject-summing argument, which holds that combining distinct subjects of experience is impossible. Goff (2016) and Miller (2017) proposed a 'phenomenal bonding relation' to explain how subjects could compose. This paper examines that solution and argues it does not adequately address the subject-summing argument, leaving the combination problem unresolved.