Review of philosophy and psychology
January 1, 2017
Marie Guillot
115 citations
A distinction is sometimes drawn between the qualitative character of an experience (how it feels, e.g., blueish) and its subjective character (that there is anything it feels like). This paper argues that discussions of subjective character conflate three different notions: for-me-ness, me-ness, and mineness. These notions are not equivalent; there is no conceptual implication from for-me-ness to me-ness or mineness. Empirical evidence from clinical cases suggests they may correspond to different properties, though the conceptual point stands independently. The paper examines four existing arguments from subjective character that rely on an undifferentiated use of these notions and finds them flawed for this reason.
Review of philosophy and psychology
January 1, 2022
Maxwell J D Ramstead, Anil K Seth, Casper Hesp et al.
75 citations
A version of neurophenomenology is presented that uses generative modelling techniques from computational neuroscience and biology to formally model descriptions of lived experience from the phenomenological tradition (e.g., Husserl, Merleau-Ponty). The approach, called computational phenomenology, is situated within the broader project of naturalizing phenomenology. Philosophical objections to that project are evaluated, and the generative modelling framework is reviewed. The approach differs from previous uses of generative modelling for consciousness by constructing computational models of inferential or interpretive processes that best explain particular kinds of lived experience.
Review of philosophy and psychology
January 1, 2017
Kathrin Glüer
13 citations
The word 'looks' in English has several distinct meanings: epistemic (inference from appearance), comparative (resemblance), and phenomenal (direct description of visual appearance). This paper argues these are genuinely different senses (polysemy). For phenomenal 'looks', the author contends it does not express a propositional attitude (like 'seems to me that...') but directly ascribes a relational property to an object—a 'look' that is ultimately phenomenal, involving the subject's experience. The paper endorses an argument that phenomenal 'looks' can apply to a wide range of properties beyond color, shape, and distance, raising a puzzle about how this works compositionally. These linguistic findings support phenomenal intentionalism, the view that visual experiences themselves are propositional attitudes with contents about how things look.