Review of philosophy and psychology
January 1, 2022
Maxwell J D Ramstead, Anil K Seth, Casper Hesp et al.
75 citations
A version of neurophenomenology is presented that uses generative modelling techniques from computational neuroscience and biology to formally model descriptions of lived experience from the phenomenological tradition (e.g., Husserl, Merleau-Ponty). The approach, called computational phenomenology, is situated within the broader project of naturalizing phenomenology. Philosophical objections to that project are evaluated, and the generative modelling framework is reviewed. The approach differs from previous uses of generative modelling for consciousness by constructing computational models of inferential or interpretive processes that best explain particular kinds of lived experience.
ACS chemical neuroscience
February 7, 2024
Pedro A M Mediano, Fernando E Rosas, Christopher Timmermann et al.
60 citations
LSD increases brain entropy (neural signal diversity) across all conditions, but the effect is strongest when eyes are closed. Brain entropy changes correlate with subjective psychedelic experience ratings, except when viewing a video, possibly because external stimuli compete with LSD-induced imagery. This shows context modulates neural dynamics during psychedelic experiences, highlighting the importance of environment in psychedelic psychotherapy.
NeuroImage
November 1, 2022
Hardik Rajpal, Pedro A M Mediano, Fernando E Rosas et al.
23 citations
Schizophrenia and drug-induced states from LSD and ketamine both increase neural signal diversity, but they differ in brain connectivity: schizophrenia shows increased information flow from front to back of the brain, while the drugs reduce it. These differences can be modeled by altering Bayesian inference in a predictive processing framework: drug effects correspond to reduced precision of prior beliefs, whereas schizophrenia involves increased precision of sensory information. The findings clarify similarities and differences between these altered states, with implications for understanding consciousness and developing mental health treatments.
PLoS biology
October 1, 2025
Michele Angelo Colombo, Jacopo Favaro, Ezequiel Mikulan et al.
7 citations
After hemispherotomy surgery for epilepsy, which disconnects an entire brain hemisphere, the isolated cortex shows brainwave patterns typical of deep sleep or anesthesia, not wakefulness. In 10 pediatric patients, EEG recordings revealed prominent slow oscillations and a steeper spectral decay in the disconnected hemisphere, while the connected hemisphere maintained normal waking patterns. These sleep-like patterns persisted years after surgery, suggesting the isolated cortex likely lacks awareness.
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences
December 9, 2019
David J Schwartzman, Daniel Bor, Nicolas Rothen et al.
7 citations
Synaesthesia, where specific stimuli automatically trigger additional perceptual experiences, offers insight into conscious perception. While traditionally considered congenital, growing evidence shows that synaesthesia-like experiences can be induced in non-synaesthetes, even in adulthood. This review examines various methods for artificially inducing such experiences and compares them to natural synaesthesia's hallmarks: consistency, automaticity, and lack of 'perceptual presence'. The authors conclude that many aspects of synaesthesia can be induced, suggesting developmental and learning components in its acquisition and extending evidence of perceptual plasticity in adults.
Physics of life reviews
March 1, 2026
Christopher J Whyte, Andrew W Corcoran, Jonathan Robinson et al.
5 citations
Subjective experience is multifaceted, making it hard for traditional neuroscientific theories of consciousness to be compared because each focuses on different aspects like perceptual awareness or global states. This work instead starts from active inference, a first-principles framework that models behavior as approximate Bayesian inference, and builds a minimal theory of consciousness from shared features of computational models derived under active inference. By reviewing studies that apply active inference models to consciousness, the authors identify a small set of theoretical commitments implicit in these models, pointing toward a minimal and testable theory of consciousness.