Ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness claim to explain conscious states in terms of what-it-is-like-ness. This paper examines two arguments that bear on this claim: the misrepresentation argument, which suggests that radical misrepresentation leads to a contradiction, and the awareness argument, which aims to support higher-order theories by asserting that subjects are aware of all their conscious states. The paper shows that higher-order theorists can adopt a specific reading of what-it-is-like-ness and there being something it is like that seems to address both arguments. However, on this reading, the awareness argument provides no support for ambitious theories, and the response to the misrepresentation argument simply ignores it. The paper concludes that higher-order theories cannot account for what-it-is-like-ness.
A dualist theory of experience must meet five constraints: experiences cause physical effects without violating physical causal closure, avoid overdetermination, follow psychophysical laws linking them to physical states, and ensure functional duplicates share the same phenomenology. Existing dualist theories fail on one or more points. The paper constructs 'delegatory dualism,' in which physical states delegate causal responsibilities to experiences, satisfying all constraints.
The conceivability of ghosts challenges physicalism, suggesting that if these entities—whose existence is solely defined by consciousness—are conceivable, then they could be metaphysically possible. Goff's argument posits that this undermines a priori physicalism. However, drawing from insights on conceivability, the ability to imagine such scenarios may weaken the reliability of conceivability as a guide to reality. With a focus on philosophical discourse, this perspective indicates that while ghosts can be conceived, a posteriori physicalists might not need to fear their implications.