A dualist theory of experience.
Philosophical studies January 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02290-3 via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA dualist theory of experience must meet five constraints: experiences cause physical effects without violating physical causal closure, avoid overdetermination, follow psychophysical laws linking them to physical states, and ensure functional duplicates share the same phenomenology. Existing dualist theories fail on one or more points. The paper constructs 'delegatory dualism,' in which physical states delegate causal responsibilities to experiences, satisfying all constraints.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Causal closure Mental causation Non-reductive functionalism Organizational invariance Overdetermination |
| Key finding | Delegatory dualism satisfies five stringent constraints for a dualist theory of experience by having physical states delegate causal responsibilities to experiences. |
Abstract
Dualism holds that experiences somehow arise from physical states, despite being neither identical with nor grounded in such states. This paper motivates a stringent set of constraints on constructing a dualist theory of experience. To meet the constraints, a dualist theory must: (1) construe experiences as causes of physical effects, (2) ensure that experiences do not cause observable violations of the causal closure of the physical domain, (3) avoid overdetermination, (4) specify a set of psychophysical laws that yield experiences as a function of physical states, and (5) ensure that functional duplication preserves phenomenology. After motivating these constraints and explaining why existing dualist theories satisfy only some of them, I construct a dualist theory that satisfies all of them. On the resulting theory-which I call delegatory dualism-experiences uphold causal responsibilities "delegated" to them by physical states.