Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics : CQ : the international journal of healthcare ethics committees
October 1, 2016
Walter Glannon
32 citations
Consciousness defines personhood and enables both pleasurable and painful experiences. This essay examines four neurological conditions—intraoperative awareness, prolonged disorders of consciousness, locked-in syndrome, and the effects of narcotics and sedation on terminally ill patients—to explore when consciousness benefits or harms patients. The ethical significance of consciousness depends on the content of one's experience and whether one can report that content to others. Phenomenal consciousness, the subjective feel of awareness, can be harmful when a patient expects unconsciousness or when it allows uncommunicated suffering. Technology enabling reliable communication could benefit neurologically compromised patients. The conditions raise the question of when consciousness is preferable to unconsciousness.
Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics : CQ : the international journal of healthcare ethics committees
October 1, 2022
David B Yaden, Brian D Earp, Roland R Griffiths
31 citations
Psychedelics partly achieve their therapeutic effects through the subjective experiences they produce and how individuals interpret those experiences. Because these subjective effects can be disturbing for people with certain mental illnesses, researchers are developing 'nonsubjective' psychedelics that cause similar biological changes without the characteristic subjective effects. The authors broadly support creating such substances for scientific and clinical reasons but argue they should be reserved only for cases where subjective effects are specifically contraindicated. Classic psychedelics that produce subjective experiences should remain the default standard of care, as withholding typically positive, meaningful, and therapeutic experiences from most patients raises ethical concerns.
Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics : CQ : the international journal of healthcare ethics committees
June 27, 2023
Katherine Cheung, Kyle Patch, Brian D Earp et al.
27 citations
Psychedelics like psilocybin produce altered states of consciousness that change perception, cognition, and affect. They show promise as therapeutic agents combined with talk therapy for conditions such as major depression and substance use disorder. It remains unclear whether these acute subjective effects are necessary for therapeutic benefits. This uncertainty has sparked debate about whether psychedelics without subjective effects could still have therapeutic impact, or whether the subjective effects are essential for full therapeutic realization.
Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics : CQ : the international journal of healthcare ethics committees
March 2, 2023
Nathan Emmerich, Bryce Humphries
27 citations
Psychedelic drugs such as psilocybin, ayahuasca, ketamine, MDMA, and LSD show therapeutic potential for conditions like PTSD, depression, existential distress, and addiction. Unlike conventional psychoactive drugs, psychedelics are experiential therapies whose value lies in the subjective experiences they induce. Some argue that trainee psychedelic therapists should undergo firsthand psychedelic experience to fully understand these effects. The authors question this, finding the claimed epistemic benefits not uniquely compelling and the evidence for their contribution to training insufficient. They conclude that requiring trainees to take psychedelics is not ethically legitimate, though permitting voluntary experience may be acceptable given potential epistemic benefit cannot be ruled out.
Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics : CQ : the international journal of healthcare ethics committees
April 1, 2025
Julia Alessandra Harzheim
3 citations
Human beings increasingly see themselves as products of data and algorithms, mirroring machines and reducing mind to brain processes. This book counters such self-reification by defending a humanism of embodiment: corporeality, vitality, and embodied freedom form the basis of self-determined existence, using technology as a means rather than submitting to it. It offers an embodied and enactive account of the person—neither pure mind nor brain but a living being in relation with others—applied to AI, transhumanism, virtual reality, neuroscience, psychiatry, and societal acceleration that fosters disembodiment.