Feminist socio-political critiques often rely on social constructionism, which holds that oppressive structures are real but contingent—meaning they could be different. Some philosophers argue that without a metaphysical grounding, such critiques lack substance. This paper contends that current debates on this issue rest on flawed assumptions rooted in monist or dualist ontologies and a view of subjects as purely rational agents. The author proposes enactivism, inspired by phenomenology, as an alternative: it advances an ontology of interdependence and sees subjects as organisms embedded in a meaningful world. Enactivism reconciles contingency with fundamentality by defining fundamentality through radical contingency, thereby legitimizing feminist critiques without reducing their substantive force.
Starting from Merleau-Ponty's call to begin again in both philosophy and politics, this paper examines how his later ontological ideas—radical interdependence (the reversibility thesis and 'flesh') and radical contingency—carry political implications for humanism, democracy, and progress. The author argues that recognizing ontological interdependence and contingency can support a flourishing democracy, and that ontology is inherently political: getting ontology right is a matter of discovery, not choice. The paper traces Merleau-Ponty's shift from early political engagements with Nazism, Marxism, and humanism toward later ontological concerns, noting his distancing from Marxism after revelations of Stalin's gulags and the Korean War, while maintaining no rupture in his philosophical vision.