Frontiers in systems neuroscience
January 1, 2019
Tom Sikkens, Conrado A Bosman, Umberto Olcese
48 citations
Feedback connections, which make up a large portion of neural links in the thalamocortical system, are thought to be essential for conscious perception, according to major theories of consciousness. These theories predict that feedback modulation should be reduced in nonconscious brain states such as non-REM sleep and anesthesia, and when sensory stimuli are not perceived. However, recent experiments on mismatch negativity, a phenomenon linked to top-down modulation, show that feedback modulation persists during nonconscious states, though it is generally dampened. These deviations challenge current theories and may require reevaluating how consciousness is assessed in supposedly nonconscious states.
Frontiers in systems neuroscience
January 1, 2021
Giorgio Vallortigara
34 citations
Animals distinguish self-generated from externally caused sensory input using an efference copy mechanism, a copy of movement commands sent to sensory structures. This paper links that mechanism to philosopher Thomas Reid's idea that senses have a double province: to make us feel and to make us perceive. Psychologist Nicholas Humphrey argued that the former identifies with signals from bodily sense organs combined with an internalized evaluative response, i.e., phenomenal consciousness. The author discusses a possible departure from the classical efference copy implementation that could provide senses with such a double province, potentially advancing understanding of consciousness.
Frontiers in systems neuroscience
January 1, 2019
Evert A. Boonstra, Heleen A. Slagter
19 citations
The article argues that Karl Friston's free energy minimization framework, which claims to unify brain theory and apply to all living systems, aligns with Georg Hegel's dialectics. Drawing on Catherine Malabou's work, the authors demonstrate that Friston's approach reinvigorates Hegelian dialectics from a neuroscience perspective, requiring a reading through Hegel's speculative philosophy. This reading moves beyond the cognitivism-enactivism debate about whether organisms are secluded from or open to their surroundings. Instead, the tension between these positions is itself operative at the organismic level as a contradiction the organism sustains throughout life: secluded existence depends on perpetual relation with surroundings, and the condition for that relation is a secluded entity. This internalized contradiction grounds the perpetual process of free energy minimization.
Frontiers in systems neuroscience
January 1, 2022
Thurston Lacalli
9 citations
Conscious experience can be modeled as occupying a high-dimensional space (E-space) whose dimensions correspond to the degrees of freedom needed to specify sets of qualia. Phenomenal consciousness likely originated as one or more multidimensional ur-experiences that combined multiple forms of experience. Evolution then extracted the qualia best suited to each sensory modality through a process called dimensional sorting. This framework provides a systematic way to think about early stages in the evolution of consciousness, moving beyond narrative and conjecture alone.
Frontiers in systems neuroscience
January 1, 2022
Brian Key, Oressia Zalucki, Deborah J Brown
9 citations
Subjective experience—conscious awareness—requires a specific neural architecture, not merely activity in higher cortical regions. The authors propose that any system capable of subjective experience must implement stacked forward models that predict the output of neural processing from inputs, enabling prediction, error detection, and feedback control. They call this the hierarchical forward models algorithm. This framework defines a minimal but not sufficient neural architecture necessary for subjective experience. It implies that animals lacking this architecture cannot have subjective experience, regardless of behavior or brain similarities to humans. The approach shifts focus from which brain regions are active to what computations are performed.
Frontiers in systems neuroscience
January 1, 2022
Paul Skokowski
9 citations
Explaining qualia—the subjective contents of conscious experience—within a naturalistic framework is challenging. Examining Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory reveals each fails to adequately account for qualia. To overcome this, the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, is proposed that preserves multiple realizability while providing a scientifically grounded approach to explaining qualia in the natural world.