Trivialisms about Explanatory Gap

The paper argues that the explanatory gap between physical facts and phenomenal consciousness may be less special than philosophers often assume. It first examines Schaffer's modest Trivialism, which combines the idea that explanatory gaps are common with the claim that the phenomenal gap is not uniquely special, and responds to a critique of that view. It then develops a more radical Trivialism, contending that epistemic insensitivity gives fewer reasons to posit a phenomenal gap compared to other gaps, such as mereological ones. The paper also addresses objections from metaontological deflationism and the possibility of a priori metaphysical knowledge.

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Abstract

Abstract A spectre of anti-physicalism haunts philosophy of mind: we seem unable to explain how the phenomenal arises from the physical. Rather than repeat clichés about the profundity of this explanatory gap, in this paper, I defend a set of Trivialisms, which suggest the phenomenal explanatory gap may not be as special as widely assumed. I start with surveying Schaffer’s modest Trivialism, combining anti-exceptionalism (gaps are everywhere) and the thesis of non-specialness (the phenomenal one is not uniquely special), and respond to Aleksiev’s critique. Then I develop a more radical Trivialism, arguing from epistemic insensitivity that we have fewer reasons to posit the phenomenal gap than others (e.g., mereological). Finally, I address some potential objections including those from metaontological deflationism, the possibility of a priori metaphysical knowledge, among others.