Fathoming the Depth of Awareness

A critical commentary on Neil Mehta's pluralist theory of conscious perception, which claims that conscious perception involves two distinct kinds of sensory awareness, including 'deep awareness.' The author raises three objections. First, Mehta argues that deep awareness explains how conscious states infallibly reveal essences of sensory quality universals; the author undermines part of that defense and argues that such revelation is false. Second, Mehta's 'E theory' uses deep awareness to explain hard problems of consciousness; the author argues this theory is false. Third, Mehta claims that being deeply aware of a universal partly constitutes an experience's phenomenal character; the author argues this is false.

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Abstract

Abstract Neil Mehta puts forward a pluralist theory of conscious perception, on which to consciously perceive is to deploy not just one, but two distinct kinds of sensory awareness in concert. Here I present three reservations regarding one of these kinds awareness - deep awareness. First, Mehta introduces deep awareness as a relation whose deployment explains the putative fact that conscious states unerringly reveal to us a substantial portion of the essences of sensory quality universals (“revelation” and “infallibility” theses). I both undermine a part of Mehta’s defense of revelation and infallibility, and argue that revelation is false. Second, the main theoretical purpose for which Mehta introduces deep awareness is to explain the presence of hard problems of consciousness. Mehta calls this explanation “the E theory”. I argue that this theory is false. Third, a central upshot of Mehta’s theory of deep awareness is that to have an experience in which you are deeply aware of a universal U is to have an experience whose phenomenal character is partly constituted by U. I argue that this is false.