Revelation, Consciousness+ and the Phenomenal Powers View

Revelation—the idea that introspection reveals the essential nature of conscious states—is often used to argue against physicalism. This paper highlights a neglected problem: introspection does not reveal conscious states as essentially causal, which pressures views toward epiphenomenalism. The author critiques Hedda Hassel Mørch’s 'phenomenal powers view' as an inadequate response and instead defends a version of the 'consciousness+' response, which accommodates the causal role of consciousness without requiring its essence to be revealed by introspection.

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Abstract

Revelation is roughly the thesis that we have introspective access to the essential nature of our conscious states. This thesis is appealed to in arguments against physicalism. Little attention has been given to the problem that Revelation is a source of pressure in the direction of epiphenomenalism, as introspection does not seem to reveal our conscious states as being essentially causal. I critique Hedda Hassel Mørch’s ‘phenomenal powers view’ response to this difficulty, before defending a form of the ‘consciousness+’ response.