Grounding Physicalism and the New Challenge of Consciousness
Marcelino Botin, Markel Kortabarria
Erkenntnis February 16, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-026-01063-6 via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractGrounding is a non-reductive relation that helps physicalists address the hard problem of consciousness, but grounding physicalists face a new challenge: explaining substantive phenomenal knowledge, especially revelation—the claim that such knowledge reveals the essence of phenomenal properties. Revelation appears to conflict with the view that grounding relations are essence-mediated. Two solutions are offered: first, drop essence-mediation and adopt a law-based formulation of grounding physicalism, though this risks resembling dualism; second, retain essence-mediation and argue that, despite introspective appearances, phenomenal properties do not have purely phenomenal essences. Both approaches are viable, showing grounding physicalism can address the challenge.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Physicalism Introspection Relation database Consciousness Revelation |
| Key finding | Grounding physicalists can accommodate revelation either by adopting a law-based formulation of grounding or by denying that phenomenal properties have purely phenomenal essences. |
Abstract
Abstract Grounding is a non-reductive relation which promises to help physicalists deal with the hard problem of consciousness. Grounding physicalists, however, are yet to face the new challenge for physicalism, which consists of explaining our substantive phenomenal knowledge. Among the difficulties posed by this challenge, grounding physicalists struggle the most in accounting for revelation, the claim that our phenomenal knowledge is not only substantive, but also essence-revealing. Revelation is said to be in tension with the view that grounding relations are essence-mediated. We argue that grounding physicalists can accommodate revelation in two ways. First, they can drop the claim that the physical/phenomenal grounding relation is essence-mediated and adopt a law-based formulation of grounding physicalism. However, to make this work, they must show that the resulting view does not bear the costs of dualism. Second, they can retain essence-mediation and explain why, contrary to introspective appearances, phenomenal properties do not have purely phenomenal essences. We contend that both approaches are viable, grounding physicalism can address the new challenge.