Beyond the Minimal Self

Sartre's theory of selfhood combines features of both minimal-self and narrative-self theories: it emphasizes the singular first-person perspective while also stressing the practical intelligibility of experience. The theory's distinctiveness lies in its idea that consciousness is necessarily related to an ideal of self-coincidence, which haunts the pre-reflective cogito and gives meaning to lived experiences. Consciousness exists as a question to itself, answered by projecting possibilities as creative and symbolic realizations of this ideal. Both the ideal and the possibilities of consciousness are lived in the manner of the imaginary, connecting Sartre's theories of imagination and selfhood.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This article reconstructs Sartre’s theory of selfhood against the background of the contemporary debate between minimal-self theories and narrative-self theories. I argue that Sartre’s theory incorporates both an emphasis on the singular first-person perspective, which is characteristic of minimal-self theories, and an emphasis on the practical intelligibility of experience, which is characteristic of narrative-self theories. The distinctiveness of the Sartrean combination of these motifs consists in its idea of the necessary ideal-relatedness of consciousness. According to Sartre, the logical structure of the pre-reflective cogito requires the haunting presence of an ideal of self-coincidence, which determines for consciousness the meaning of its lived experiences. Consciousness exists as a question to itself due to this ideal-relatedness, and it answers this question by projecting its possibilities as creative and symbolic realizations of this ideal. Establishing the connection between Sartre’s theory of imagination and his theory of selfhood, I suggest that both the ideal and the possibility of consciousness are lived in the manner of the imaginary.