From function to freedom: enactivism between being and becoming

Enactivism, a theory of mind and life, is undergoing a metaphysical shift as some theorists adopt the 'affirmationist' ontologies of Gilbert Simondon and Gilles Deleuze, which view becoming as a non-teleological process where identities emerge from pre-individual fields. The author argues that this turn is incompatible with enactivism's foundational commitment to self-organizing organismic totalities. Instead, the paper develops a metaphysical framework that preserves these commitments while rejecting functionalist assumptions. It aligns enactivism with Marxist dialectical materialism and reinterprets Hans Jonas's account of life, which grounds meaning and purpose in the dynamic structure of living form rather than instrumental functions, offering a renewed foundation for theorizing purposiveness, autonomy, and change.

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Abstract

Abstract Enactivism is undergoing a metaphysical shift. In pursuit of a more open-ended account of organismic becoming, several theorists have turned to the “affirmationist” ontologies of Gilbert Simondon and Gilles Deleuze. These frameworks conceive becoming as a non-teleological process in which identities emerge as contingent actualizations of pre-individual fields. In this paper, I argue that this turn is metaphysically incompatible with enactivism’s foundational commitments to self-organizing organismic totalities. As an alternative, I develop a metaphysical framework that preserves these commitments while dispensing with functionalist assumptions immenent to contemporary enactivism. I begin by establishing enactivism’s metaphysical alignment with Marxist dialectical materialism. This renders enactivism’s functionalist outlook more legible and clarifies its tensions with affirmationist metaphysics. From here, I turn to Hans Jonas’s account of life, which I reinterpret as resisting the reduction of purpose to organizational maintenance. For Jonas, life grounds meaning, affect, and activity in the dynamic structure of living form, rather than in its instrumental functions. This reorientation offers enactivism a renewed foundation for theorizing purposiveness, autonomy, and change.