Self-defense: Deflecting Deflationary and Eliminativist Critiques of the Sense of Ownership

The author defends a phenomenological account of the sense of ownership as part of a minimal sense of self against deflationary and eliminativist critiques. They argue that the phenomenological account is itself deflationary because it treats the sense of ownership as implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action. Against eliminativism, the author cites empirical evidence supporting pre-reflective self-awareness, which underlies the sense of ownership. Finally, they respond to the claim that phenomenology lacks a positive account by showing how the sense of ownership functions within an enactivist, action-oriented view of embodied cognition.

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Abstract

I defend a phenomenological account of the sense of ownership as part of a minimal sense of self from those critics who propose either a deflationary or eliminativist critique. Specifically, I block the deflationary critique by showing that in fact the phenomenological account is itself a deflationary account insofar as it takes the sense of ownership to be implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action. I address the eliminativist view by considering empirical evidence that supports the concept of pre-reflective self-awareness, which underpins the sense of ownership. Finally, I respond to claims that phenomenology does not offer a positive account of the sense of ownership by showing the role it plays in an enactivist (action-oriented) view of embodied cognition.