Shared Ontologies: 4e Cognition and Montemayor’s Humanitarian AI
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness September 1, 2024 DOI: 10.1142/s2705078524400058
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis paper identifies common ground between Carlos Montemayor's account of mind and AI, as presented in his précis for *The Prospect of Humanitarian Artificial Intelligence*, and enactivist philosophy. The author notes that Montemayor emphasizes autonomy, embeddedness, perspective, and social interaction, yet does not engage with 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognitive science, particularly enactivism, despite his heavy reliance on biological and autonomous features to distinguish intelligence from consciousness.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Montemayor's account of mind and AI converges with enactivism on several points, but he surprisingly fails to engage with 4E ontologies. |
Abstract
This short paper traces some convergences between the ontologies of mind and AI presented in Carlos Montemayor’s Precis for The Prospect of Humanitarian Artificial Intelligence and Enactivism, with a focus on autonomy, embeddedness, perspective, and social interaction. I argue that it is surprising that Montemayor does not engage with any of the traditional 4e ontologies here, especially enactivism, considering his strong reliance on biology and autonomy in carving up intelligence and consciousness.