Realism without tears I: Müller's Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies.

The Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies, which holds that we directly perceive the activity of our nerves rather than external properties, has long shaped physiology, psychology, and philosophy of perception. Johannes Peter Müller's canonical early statement of the Doctrine profoundly influenced 19th- and early 20th-century thought, especially through his student Helmholtz. Contrary to the common assumption that the Doctrine implies idealism or skepticism, Müller himself advanced a realist interpretation that aligns with modern epistemic structural realism. This paper analyzes Müller's structuralist epistemology and reconstructs his articulation of the Doctrine, arguing for its continued relevance to contemporary psychology, philosophy of perception, and history of philosophy of science.

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Abstract

The Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies has been and continues to be enormously influential in the physiology, psychology, and philosophy of perception. In simple terms, the Doctrine states that we directly perceive in the first instance the activity of our nerves, rather than properties in the external world. The canonical early statement of the Doctrine by the physiologist Johannes Peter Müller had profound influence on both the philosophy and psychology of the 19th and early 20th centuries, especially as reformulated and transmitted by Müller's student Helmholtz. A common assumption of historical and ongoing debate about the Doctrine has been its supposedly idealist or skeptical implications. What is not commonly recognized is that Müller himself advanced a realist interpretation along lines that would be recognized today as a form of epistemic structural realism. This paper analyzes Müller's structuralist epistemology in detail and reconstructs his articulation and defense of the Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies in its canonical form. Part II argues for the continued importance of the Doctrine and its structuralist interpretation for contemporary psychology, philosophy of perception, and history of philosophy of science.