Phenomenology and embodied cognition

The chapter examines phenomenology's contributions to the understanding of embodied cognition. It defines phenomenology as the philosophical tradition begun by Edmund Husserl and developed by thinkers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre. The author notes that recent phenomenologists have engaged with theoretical and empirical cognitive science, particularly enactive and embodied conceptions of mind. The chapter surveys historical resources defining the phenomenology of the body, considers how phenomenological methodology relates to scientific investigations of embodied cognition, and identifies insights about embodied cognition that phenomenology provides.

Study at a glance

Abstract

As this volume makes clear, research on embodied cognition draws from a number of disciplines and is supported by a variety of methodological strategies. In this chapter I focus on what phenomenology has contributed to our understanding of embodied cognition. I take “phenomenology” to mean the philosophical tradition initiated in the twentieth century by Edmund Husserl and developed by a variety of philosophers, including Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Aron Gurwitsch, and numerous others. More recently phenomenologists following this tradition have been drawn into theoretical and empirical research in the cognitive sciences, and especially into discussions of enactive and embodied conceptions of the mind (e.g. Dreyfus, 1973, 2002; Gallagher, 2005; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012; Thompson, 2007; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991). I’ll start by looking at some of the historical resources that de?ne the phenomenology of the body. I’ll then consider how phenomenology, as a methodology, relates to scienti?c investigations of embodied cognition, and ?nally go on to identify some of the insights about embodied cognition that phenomenology provides