On the intrinsic nature of states of consciousness

Two contrasting philosophical accounts of the stream of consciousness are examined. William James views each momentary state of consciousness as a complex, unitary awareness that simultaneously instantiates many features and takes multiple objects; emotion, on this view, pervades and colors the entire state. Brian O'Shaughnessy instead proposes that the basic unit of the stream is the attention, a psychic space occupied by several simultaneous experiences; emotion here is one distinct experience among others, interacting with them by limiting their number and intensity. The two theorists also differ on how non-inferential self-awareness of one's own conscious states is achieved.

Study at a glance

Abstract

What are the states of consciousness in themselves, those pulses of mentality that follow one upon another in tight succession and constitute the stream of consciousness? William James conceives of each of them as being, typically, a complex unitary awareness that instantiates many features and takes a multiplicity of objects. In contrast, Brian O’Shaughnessy claims that the basic durational component of the stream of consciousness is the attention, which he understands to be something like a psychic space that is simultaneously occupied by several experiences. Whereas, according to the first conception, emotion is a feature of a temporal segment of the stream of consciousness and colors through and through each consciousness state that instantiates it, the second conception considers an emotion to be a distinct one of a system of simultaneous experiences that interact with each other, for example, limiting each other’s number and intensity. Among other matters discussed is the two theorists’ mutually contrasting conception of how the non-inferential awareness which we have of our states of consciousness is accomplished.