How experimental neuroscientists can fix the hard problem of consciousness.

For materialists, the hard problem of consciousness is an explanatory gap: why does brain activity produce experience rather than nothing at all? This paper argues that the interventionist theory of explanation, which relies on systematic experimental interventions and invariant generalizations, can help move beyond that gap. The authors propose that second-order interventions—interventions that alter the relationship between first-order interventions and conscious experience—are key, just as they were for other scientific mysteries. They also suggest that safe, reliable self-intervention can address both the hard problem and the meta-problem (why the hard problem feels so intractable). Current intervention strategies are evaluated for improvement.

Study at a glance

Abstract

For the materialist, the hard problem is fundamentally an explanatory problem. Solving it requires explaining why the relationship between brain and experience is the way it is and not some other way. We use the tools of the interventionist theory of explanation to show how a systematic experimental project could help move beyond the hard problem. Key to this project is the development of second-order interventions and invariant generalizations. Such interventions played a crucial scientific role in untangling other scientific mysteries, and we suggest that the same will be true of consciousness. We further suggest that the capacity for safe and reliable self-intervention will play a key role in overcoming both the hard and meta-problems of consciousness. Finally, we evaluate current strategies for intervention, with an eye to how they might be improved.