The Hard Terminological Problem of Consciousness

The article argues that certain problems in philosophy of mind can be resolved only by adhering strictly to the logical law of identity, meaning the term "consciousness" must be used in a single, consistent sense. Defining consciousness as the space in which objects distinguished by the subject are represented, the author examines issues including the fixation of consciousness level, the relationship between consciousness and thought, the internal and external, and consciousness and the body. The reactive conception of action is shown to be insufficient for solving the hard problem of consciousness, and a shift to an active paradigm is necessary, which would reframe many questions in philosophy of mind.

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Abstract

Abstract This article demonstrates that certain issues of philosophy of mind can only be explained via strict observance of the logical law of identity, that is, use of the term “consciousness” in only one meaning. Based on the understanding of consciousness as space in which objects distinguished by the subject are represented, this article considers problems such as the fixation of the consciousness level, correlation between consciousness and thought, between the internal and the external, and between consciousness and the body. It demonstrates the insufficiency of the reactive conception of action for the resolution of the hard problem of consciousness and the necessity of a transition to an active paradigm in which many issues in philosophy of mind would be formulated differently.