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Physics and Five Problems in the Philosophy of Mind

Stuart Kauffman

arXiv Preprint Archive July 15, 2009 via arXiv

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Six enduring problems in philosophy of mind—how mind acts on matter, whether mind is a mere epiphenomenon, the source of free will, the source of responsible free will, the evolutionary advantage of consciousness, and the nature of consciousness itself—are addressed using two physical postulates. The mind-brain system is a quantum coherent but reversibly decohering and recohering system; mind does not causally act on brain but acausally decoheres to classicity, averting epiphenomenalism. A quantum mind yields a merely random free will, not a responsible one. The more radical proposal is that the quantum-classical interface can be nonrandom yet lawless, providing a source for responsible free will.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Physics.hist-ph Mind-brain problem Mind-body problem Consciousness-brain interaction Neurophilosophy
Key finding The quantum-classical interface may be nonrandom yet lawless, providing a source for responsible free will and making algorithmic simulation of reality impossible.

Abstract

Since Descartes' dualism, with his res extensa and res cogitans, six fundamental problems in the philosophy and natural history of mind are these: 1. how does mind act on matter? 2. If mind does not act on matter is mind a mere epiphenomenon? 3. What might be the source of free will? 4. What might be the source of a responsible free will? 5. Why might it have been selectively advantageous to evolve consciousness? 6. What is consciousness? I approach the first five of the above six problems based on two physical postulates. First the mind-brain system is a quantum coherent, but reversibly decohering and recohering system. This allows me to answer 1) above, mind does not act causally on brain at all, rather it acausally decohers to classicity (for all practical purposes), hence has consequences for brain and body as matter. Epiphenomenalism is averted. A quantum mind, because it is acausal on Copenhagen including Born, yields a free will, but a merely random free will, not a responsible free will. Second, the most radical part of this article proposes that the quantum classical interface is not always describable by a law: specifically in a special relativity setting, no function, F, maps the present state of the system mind-brain into its future. In its place is a nonrandom yet lawless process. I seek in this non-random yet lawless process a source for a responsible free will. Finally, if the quantum-classical boundary can be non-random yet lawless, then no algorithmic simulation of the world or ourselves can calculate the real world, hence the evolutionary selective advantages for evolving consciousness to know it may be great. I make no progress on problem 6, the hard problem of qualia.

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