Consciousness and Selfhood
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.29
Summary
Recent discussions in the philosophy of mind have shifted from focusing solely on diachronic identity and persistence questions to exploring synchronic identity and its relationship with phenomenal consciousness. This debate raises questions about whether conscious experiences involve or disclose the self, contrasting with Lichtenberg's objection to Descartes that experiences may simply occur without implying a self.
Abstract
Not that long ago, discussions of selfhood in philosophy of mind tended to focus on diachronic identity and the so-called persistence question. Important as this question might be, it does, however, not exhaust the topic of selfhood. In recent years, the focus has shifted somewhat from diachronic to synchronic identity and given rise to a lively debate concerning the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and selfhood. Are our conscious experiences self-involving or self-disclosing (in a manner yet to be determined), or was Lichtenberg right in his famous objection to Descartes: Experiences simply take place, and that is all. Is saying cogito and affirming the existence of an I already saying too much?