The global workspace theory, the phenomenal concept strategy, and the distribution of consciousness.
Consciousness and Cognition August 6, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2020.102992 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
The author argues that Peter Carruthers' claim that global workspace theory implies no facts about animal consciousness also implies no facts about human consciousness, which is an overreach. The key assumption that scientific theories must explain away the explanatory gap is criticized. An alternative strategy is proposed: introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal to functional concepts can individuate the global workspace in shared capacities, better reflecting scientific practice.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The assumption that scientific theories must explain away the explanatory gap is criticized, and an alternative strategy using introspectable inferential connections is proposed to defend theories of consciousness. |
Abstract
Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.