Sawing the branch of near‐death experience research: A critical analysis of Parnia et al.’s paper

Summary

A critique argues that a recent proposal to relabel near-death experiences (NDEs) as “recalled experience of death” and to consider only those with objective danger as “authentic” is not well supported by data. Instead, NDEs form a continuum of varied conscious experiences arising from the separation of processes normally combined in mental activity. The claimed core phenomenology of NDEs faces multiple criticisms, and closeness to actual death is not a decisive feature. The authors’ reliance on Raymond Moody’s model creates a biased division that cannot serve as a basis for consensus.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In their recent paper, Parnia and colleagues propose a new label for the near‐death experience (NDE): recalled experience of death. They claimed NDEs are “authentic” only when an objective danger is present and that authentic NDEs have a proven core phenomenology. We consider that these claims are insufficiently supported by empirical data. NDEs appear as a continuum of heterogeneous experiences of consciousness precipitated by the disjunction of processes usually combined in normal mental activity. The “core phenomenology” of NDEs is also opened to several criticisms. Closeness to “real” death does not appear to be a decisive criterion for characterizing NDEs. The author's adhesion to Raymond Moody's NDE model produces a biased partition of this field of research that is unable to provide the basis for a consensus.