Commentary: The poverty of embodied cognition

Summary

A long-standing view in cognitive science holds that higher thinking uses abstract, amodal mental representations and brain regions separate from sensorimotor areas. Over recent decades, many researchers have instead argued that cognition is fundamentally grounded in sensorimotor activity and bodily constraints, a position called embodied cognition (EC). However, Goldinger et al. (2016) challenged EC's applicability, asserting that some of its assumptions are unacceptable and others offer nothing new, particularly for experimental psychology. This paper agrees with some criticisms—such as that radical embodiment rejecting mental representation is a dead end—but argues that the authors' methodological perspective on EC is inadequate.

Study at a glance

Abstract

According to classic cognitive science, higher cognitive processes involve amodal mental representations (Fodor, 1975), and are carried by brain regions other than sensorimotor areas (Bechtel et al., 1998). Over the last few decades, this view has been questioned. Numerous researchers argue that cognitive processes are fundamentally rooted in sensorimotor activity and that the body both constrains and enables cognition (Wilson, 2002; Clark, 2009). Such a view is called “the embodied cognition” (EC) and it is widely applied in various fields of cognitive science, from linguistics to robotics. Recently, Goldinger et al. (2016), however, questioned its applicability. They emphasized that some assumptions of EC are unacceptable, and others proffer nothing new. Primarily, they claim that EC offers no useful insight into the classic problems of experimental psychology. Although, we agree with some theses presented in the article (e.g., radical embodiment that rejects the existence of mental representation is a blind alley), it appears the authors’ methodological view on EC is inadequate.