An Empirical Stalemate: Why Science Fails to Settle a Central Philosophical Debate About Perception

Summary

Empirical arguments in the philosophy of perception, such as the Argument from Structure, aim to settle debates between internalism and externalism about visual experience. This paper argues that the same empirical evidence used to support internalism about color experience also supports externalism about shape experience. Because a unified metaphysical account of visual experience is required, these opposing arguments cancel each other out, leading to a dialectical stalemate. Thus, empirical arguments do not overcome the limitations of armchair theorizing but instead reinforce the existing impasse.

Study at a glance

Abstract

ABSTRACT Empirical arguments in the philosophy of perception have become increasingly influential. In this paper, we evaluate the prospects for one such argument—the Argument from Structure —in light of the a priori constraint that we must give a unified account of visual experience. We argue that, correctly understood, the kinds of empirical findings marshalled in support of an internalist conclusion about color experience (or secondary quality experience more broadly) provide similar support for an externalist conclusion about shape experience (or primary quality experience more broadly). When coupled with the a priori requirement that we give a uniform metaphysical account of the two kinds of experience, we find ourselves with two arguments, equal in force, for opposing internalist and externalist conclusions about visual experience as a whole. Such empirical arguments, then, rather than taking us beyond the limitations of armchair theorizing, effectively leave us with a dialectical stalemate.