Minimal Group Agency

Summary

Groups can be considered minimal agents without being full-fledged moral or intentional agents, just as many biological organisms are. Enactivists define minimal agency through specific conditions, and existing social ontological accounts of group agency partially satisfy them. A modified version of List and Pettit's account of group agency could meet all the enactivist conditions for minimal agency.

Study at a glance

Abstract

When considering the type of agency that supports group activity, social ontologists often think of full-fledged moral and intentional agency. However, many organism-agents found in the biological sphere fail not only to be morally responsible but also would seem incapable of the rational guidance characteristic of intentional agency. This raises the possibility that some groups may qualify as minimal agents without necessarily qualifying as moral or intentional agents. In this paper, I review conditions for minimal agency as set forth by enactivists and draw from existing social ontological work to explore the extent to which these conditions might be satisfied by existing accounts of group agency. Although no account of group agency perfectly aligns with the enactivist conditions, I conclude that a suitably modified version of List and Pettit's account could.