2 papers in the library · publishing 2025-2026
Journal of Social Ontology May 8, 2025 Joshua Rust
Groups can be considered minimal agents without being full-fledged moral or intentional agents, just as many biological organisms are. Enactivists define minimal agency through specific conditions, and existing social ontological accounts of group agency partially satisfy them. A modified version of List and Pettit's account of group agency could meet all the enactivist conditions for minimal agency.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences April 1, 2026 Joshua Rust
Some social institutions might qualify as minimal agents, but not the full-blown intentional agents that humans are. Enactivist accounts of minimal agency, which normally apply to living organisms, can be extended to institutions. Two enactivist models are considered: a forward-looking Jonasian model oriented toward self-persistence, and a backward-looking retentive model responsive to precedent. Through a critique of structural functionalism, the paper argues that the retentive model better explains institutional agency. This conclusion is independently supported by philosophers such as Christian List, Philip Pettit, and Ronald Dworkin, who also characterize institutional agency as retentive.