2 papers in the library · publishing 2025
Journal of Social Ontology May 8, 2025 Joshua Rust
Groups can be considered minimal agents without being full-fledged moral or intentional agents, just as many biological organisms are. Enactivists define minimal agency through specific conditions, and existing social ontological accounts of group agency partially satisfy them. A modified version of List and Pettit's account of group agency could meet all the enactivist conditions for minimal agency.
Journal of Social Ontology May 6, 2025 Christian Kronsted
Collective effervescence, the intense shared affect of being swept away and becoming one with a crowd, is linked to psychological and physical benefits. Although 4E cognition (enactive, embodied, embedded, extended) treats cognition as inherently social and affective, no 4E account of collective effervescence exists. Integrating empirical research, the author argues that collective effervescence occurs whenever a human crowd exhibits high degrees of self-organizing bodily activity under proper boundary conditions. The experience is the felt aspect of undergoing such self-organization. A 4E dynamic-systems approach demystifies the phenomenon and opens it for use in public policy and therapy.