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Athena Demertzi

Physiology of Cognition Lab, GIGA-CRC Human Imaging Unit, University of Liege, Liege, Belgium; Psychology and Neuroscience of Cognition Research Unit, University of Liege, Liege, Belgium.

7 papers in the library · 46 citations · publishing 2020-2026

Papers

Dynamic Functional Hyperconnectivity After Psilocybin Intake Is Primarily Associated With Oceanic Boundlessness.

Biological psychiatry. Cognitive neuroscience and neuroimaging July 1, 2024 Sepehr Mortaheb, Larry D Fort, Natasha L Mason et al. 15 citations

Psilocybin produces profound alterations in both brain connectivity and subjective experience. In a randomized study, healthy volunteers received psilocybin or placebo and underwent ultrahigh field 7T fMRI scanning during the peak drug effect. Psilocybin caused widespread increases in averaged brain functional connectivity and a recurrent hyperconnected brain pattern with low blood oxygen level-dependent signal amplitude, suggesting heightened cortical arousal. This hyperconnected pattern was linked to feelings of oceanic boundlessness and visionary restructuralization. The brain's tendency to enter this hyperconnected-hyperarousal state may underlie the variant mental associations characteristic of the psychedelic experience.

Classification schemes of altered states of consciousness.

Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews August 1, 2025 Larry Douglas Fort, Cyril Costines, Marc Wittmann et al. 14 citations

A review of classification schemes for altered states of consciousness (ASCs) groups them into three types: those based on subjective experiences (state-based), those based on induction methods (method-based), and those based on neurophysiological mechanisms (neuro/physio-based). Comparing and extending these schemes can improve identification of neural correlates of consciousness and inform clinical research. The authors cluster concepts from state-based schemes to help quantify core ASC phenomenology for basic and clinical studies.

Where is my mind? A neurocognitive investigation of mind blanking.

Trends in cognitive sciences March 12, 2025 Thomas Andrillon, Antoine Lutz, Jennifer Windt et al. 14 citations

Moments during wakefulness that seem empty of any reportable thought, called mind blanking (MB), are not simply gaps in experience but distinct mental states with their own characteristics. This review maps MB by examining how people report it, its brain activity, and its links to related phenomena such as meditation and sleep. The authors propose that ongoing experience varies in richness, and contentless events represent a diverse category of mental states. They argue that recognizing MB as a reportable mental category is essential for a full understanding of how the mind works during wakefulness.

Connectome harmonic decomposition tracks the presence of disconnected consciousness during ketamine-induced unresponsiveness.

British journal of anaesthesia April 1, 2025 Milan Van Maldegem, Jakub Vohryzek, Selen Atasoy et al. 3 citations

Ketamine, at anesthetic doses, produces a state where people are unresponsive yet often report vivid inner experiences, separating conscious awareness from behavioral responsiveness. Using connectome harmonic decomposition on fMRI data, researchers found that brain signals during ketamine-induced unresponsiveness show increased fine-grained spatial patterns, indicating higher neural granularity. This harmonic signature aligned with those of LSD-induced and ketamine-induced psychedelic states, but misaligned with signatures from unconscious individuals due to propofol sedation or brain injury. The method can track changes in conscious awareness even when behavior is absent, offering a tool for consciousness and anesthesia research.

The blueprint of human functional architecture shifts from cognition to anatomy during perturbations of consciousness

bioRxiv Preprint Server June 7, 2026 Andrea I. Luppi, Dragana Manasova, Justine Y. Hansen et al. preprint

Functional connectivity in the awake human brain is shaped primarily by cognitive co-activation—the tendency of brain regions to work together during mental tasks—more than by structural or molecular constraints. This predominance is systematically lost across five datasets involving pharmacological and pathological perturbations of consciousness (chronic disorders of consciousness; anesthesia with sevoflurane, propofol, or ketamine), when cognition is disconnected from the environment or abolished. During such states, the predictors of functional architecture shift away from cognitive co-activation and toward anatomical and molecular constraints.

Low-dimensional organization of global brain states of reduced consciousness

bioRxiv Preprint Server September 28, 2022 Yonatan Sanz Perl, Carla Pallavicini, Juan Piccinini et al. preprint

Brain states are often described on a single scale from full consciousness to unconsciousness, but this ignores the complex, high-dimensional nature of brain activity. By combining whole-brain modeling, data augmentation, and deep learning, researchers mapped states of consciousness into a low-dimensional space where distances reflect similarities between states. They found an orderly trajectory from wakefulness to brain-injured patients, with coordinates related to functional modularity and structure-function coupling, both increasing as consciousness is lost. Model perturbations provided a geometric interpretation of state stability and reversibility. The work suggests conscious awareness depends on functional patterns encoded as a low-dimensional trajectory within the vast space of brain configurations.

Perturbations in dynamical models of whole-brain activity dissociate between the level and stability of consciousness

bioRxiv Preprint Server July 2, 2020 Yonatan Sanz Perl, Carla Pallavicini, Ignacio Pérez Ipiña et al. preprint

The level of consciousness—how conscious someone is—is often measured by how similar their brain activity is to normal wakefulness. However, this approach misses important information about how stable that state is. Using computer models of the whole brain, the authors show that the stability of a conscious state—how easily it can be disrupted—provides additional, complementary information. They propose a new framework that sorts brain states by both their similarity to wakefulness and their stability, which helps distinguish between different types of unconsciousness: natural sleep, anesthesia, and brain injury. This framework offers a more complete way to characterize and differentiate states of consciousness.