This article presents a model explaining the phenomenology of hypnosis, particularly plastic monoideism, by integrating Karl Friston's free energy theory and other predictive-processing theories of consciousness (Anil Seth, Andy Clark, Chris Frith). Experimental studies show a close relationship between an individual's representational system and their neurophysiological, endocrine, and immune systems. In hypnosis, mental images immediately alter even primitive systems like vision and pain, but why and how this occurs is unknown. The authors argue that constructivist epistemological paradigms align with hypnosis's phenomenology. This line of research suggests a theoretical model implementable via algorithms to support clinical hypnosis applications, and that hypnosis can be used to study consciousness.
Consciousness can be described as an internal representational reality that each individual experiences and creates. Hypnosis acts precisely on this representational reality, producing profound effects across all its dimensions because mental representations have a receptor basis. The consequence is that hypnosis can act on the receptor system, thereby affecting representations. Although strong correlations are known between the central nervous system, endocrine system, immune system, and a person's representational world, the precise nature of these correlations and how hypnosis works remain unknown. Similarly, while individual receptor systems are known, their mutual interrelationships are much less understood.