Nature reviews. Neuroscience
July 1, 2022
Anil K. Seth, Tim Bayne
836 citations
Four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness are reviewed: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories, and integrated information theory. Each theory's key characteristics are described, including which aspects of consciousness they explain, their neurobiological commitments, and supporting empirical data. The review considers how empirical debates might distinguish among these theories and outlines three ways theories need to be developed for rigorous testing. Iterative development, testing, and comparison of these theories is expected to deepen understanding of consciousness.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
April 22, 2016
Tim Bayne, Jakob Hohwy, Adrian M. Owen
443 citations
The concept of a level of consciousness is central to the science of consciousness, used to describe global states in post-comatose disorders, epileptic absence seizures, anesthesia, and sleep. However, what a level of consciousness actually means remains unclear. This paper argues that the levels-based framework for understanding global states of consciousness is untenable and instead proposes a multidimensional account of global states.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2018
Tim Bayne, Olivia Carter
153 citations
The popular and academic claim that the psychedelic state is a 'higher' state of consciousness is critically examined. The article distinguishes between conscious contents and global states, reviewing lab-based findings on psilocybin and LSD. While some aspects of consciousness are enhanced, many functional capacities are seriously compromised. The authors argue that because psychedelics affect different dimensions of consciousness in opposing ways, the unidimensional 'level-based' view of consciousness is unsupported; instead, a multidimensional conception is strongly supported. The analysis also considers implications for Global Workspace Theory and Integrated Information Theory.
Neuropsychologia
September 17, 2021
Elizabeth Schechter, Tim Bayne
11 citations
A critical evaluation of recent split-brain experiments argues that claims of unified consciousness in patient D.D.C. are premature. Two distinct conceptions of unity of consciousness are distinguished: agency-based and experience-based. Whether the behavioral data demonstrate unity of agency remains an open question, depending on both the mechanisms underlying split-brain behavior and what constitutes a single agent. Even if agency-based unity is established, the data are difficult to reconcile with full unity of consciousness in the experience-based sense.
PLoS biology
October 1, 2025
Michele Angelo Colombo, Jacopo Favaro, Ezequiel Mikulan et al.
7 citations
After hemispherotomy surgery for epilepsy, which disconnects an entire brain hemisphere, the isolated cortex shows brainwave patterns typical of deep sleep or anesthesia, not wakefulness. In 10 pediatric patients, EEG recordings revealed prominent slow oscillations and a steeper spectral decay in the disconnected hemisphere, while the connected hemisphere maintained normal waking patterns. These sleep-like patterns persisted years after surgery, suggesting the isolated cortex likely lacks awareness.
Acta paediatrica (Oslo, Norway : 1992)
February 1, 2025
Joel Frohlich, Tim Bayne
3 citations
Consciousness in infants is likely present by 5 months of age or earlier, based on a cluster of behavioral and neural markers validated in adults that can be translated to infancy. Historically, infants were operated on without anesthesia, but attitudes shifted in the 1990s toward taking consciousness seriously. Since infants cannot report experiences, no single marker suffices, so a consensus across multiple markers pointing to the same developmental period provides a convincing argument. This cluster-based approach reviews the most promising markers for early consciousness.
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
July 9, 2020
Tim Bayne
2 citations
Conscious thought, though often neglected, has been the subject of philosophical inquiry centered on three key issues: what types of mental states qualify as conscious thought and how they might be categorized; whether the consciousness of thought is fundamentally different from other forms of consciousness; and whether consciousness is essential to thought or merely an accidental feature. This chapter offers an opinionated introduction to these debates, exploring possible taxonomies, the nature of cognitive consciousness, and the relationship between consciousness and thought.