The Attention Schema Theory (AST) of consciousness attempts to unify Global Workspace Theory, Illusionism, and Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory. This response argues that AST misrepresents HOT by equating subjective experience with dualism and by presenting HOT as a form of strong illusionism, which it is not. HOT requires awareness of one's mental life through re-representation of lower-order states, but AST denies re-representing visual stimuli. An alternative unification is proposed: Global Workspace Theory and AST explain how lower-order states are assembled and maintained, while HOT accounts for subjective experience.
Higher-order theories of consciousness are empirical conjectures that can be tested and potentially falsified. The author examines what these theories imply about infant consciousness, focusing on Ned Block's argument that infants aged 6–11 months have conscious color experiences without possessing color concepts. The author contends that Block's argument does not disprove higher-order theories but instead raises empirical questions that could help distinguish between different versions of the theory or determine whether the approach is viable.
Phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, first-person experience of being—is the core phenomenon that any scientific theory of consciousness must explain. The author argues that the central task for the emerging field of cognitive neuroscience of consciousness is to evaluate and adjudicate among existing theories of human phenomenal consciousness, rather than focusing on secondary puzzles or methodological issues. This argument sets a clear explanatory target for future research in consciousness science.