A survey of 166 consciousness researchers reveals ongoing debate about the definition and study of consciousness. Most respondents believe machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is gradual across the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, covering both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. The survey identifies which theories of consciousness are considered most promising and how different theories cluster, which dependent measures best index consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be its most likely signatures. These findings offer a snapshot of current views to help prioritize research and theoretical approaches.
A survey of 232 active consciousness scientists reveals ongoing debate about the definition of consciousness and how to study it. Most respondents believe machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is gradual across the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, covering both low- and high-level cognition. The results identify which theories of consciousness are considered most promising, how different theories cluster, which behavioral measures best index consciousness, and which neural measures are most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings offer a snapshot of dominant views among professionals, potentially helping to prioritize research and theoretical approaches.
Conservative response criterion placement unexpectedly inflates effect sizes in neural measures of both conscious and unconscious processing, while liberal criterion placement reduces them. Simulations and electroencephalography decoding analyses from two studies using common subjective awareness indicators confirm these confounding effects. The widely used Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) does not protect against criterion confounds. Follow-up simulations show that the experimental context determines whether the confounding effect is larger for conscious or unconscious neural measures. Criterion placement threatens the construct validity of neural measures of consciousness.