Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2020
Edmund T Rolls
43 citations
The global workspace hypothesis of consciousness faces problems, including how global the workspace must be for consciousness to emerge. Carruthers's (2019) version, which excludes conceptual representations and reduces phenomenal consciousness to physical processes, is also challenged. A different levels-of-explanation approach to the brain-mind relation is advocated. An alternative theory proposes a computational system using Higher Order Syntactic Thoughts (HOST) to perform credit assignment on first-order thoughts of multi-step plans by manipulating symbols in syntactic working memory. This provides an evolutionary reason for such a module, with which phenomenal consciousness is associated. The HOST approach offers advantages over global workspace and Higher Order Thought theories, and may involve prefrontal cortex regions, especially the left inferior frontal gyrus.
Frontiers in computational neuroscience
January 1, 2021
Edmund T Rolls
19 citations
Mental states and brain states are linked by a non-causal supervenient relationship, not by direct causation. Events at sub-neuronal, neuronal, and network levels occur simultaneously to perform computations describable as mental states with content about the world. Causality operates within levels of explanation but not between them, allowing mental properties to be emergent yet mechanistically expected. This theory avoids dualism and reductive physicalism, rooted in computational processes. For arithmetic, mental-level algorithmic descriptions are useful; for psychiatric disorders, understanding neural mechanisms aids treatment.
Frontiers in computational neuroscience
January 1, 2021
Edmund T Rolls
17 citations
A computational neuroscience theory of mind-brain relations proposes that mental states are high-level descriptions of simultaneous sub-neuronal, neuronal, and network-level computations. These levels are linked by non-causal supervenience, not causation; causality operates only within levels, not between them. The theory requires causality to satisfy three conditions: interventionist tests, same-level events, and a temporal order with a timescale of about 10 ms. While mental-level causal descriptions can be useful, brain-level accounts may be more accurate because mental-level accounts can involve confabulation. Cases of apparent downward causation are reinterpreted as within-level causation. This approach offers a path beyond Cartesian dualism and physical reductionism.
Brain sciences
May 16, 2025
Edmund T Rolls
7 citations
A unified theory proposes that motivational states drive goal-directed actions to obtain anticipated rewards or avoid punishers, while emotional states arise when those rewards or punishers are actually received or not. The same genes and brain systems define primary rewards and punishers, like sweet taste or pain, and learn to anticipate them. The primate orbitofrontal cortex computes reward value, and the anterior cingulate cortex learns actions to obtain goals. Overlearned habits involve less emotion. The orbitofrontal cortex connects to language-related inferior frontal gyrus for declarative reports of subjective feelings. Reasoning brain systems offer alternative strategies for obtaining rewards or avoiding punishers, sometimes setting different goals than emotional systems.