Frontiers in computational neuroscience
January 1, 2021
Edmund T Rolls
19 citations
Mental states and brain states are linked by a non-causal supervenient relationship, not by direct causation. Events at sub-neuronal, neuronal, and network levels occur simultaneously to perform computations describable as mental states with content about the world. Causality operates within levels of explanation but not between them, allowing mental properties to be emergent yet mechanistically expected. This theory avoids dualism and reductive physicalism, rooted in computational processes. For arithmetic, mental-level algorithmic descriptions are useful; for psychiatric disorders, understanding neural mechanisms aids treatment.
Frontiers in computational neuroscience
January 1, 2021
Edmund T Rolls
17 citations
A computational neuroscience theory of mind-brain relations proposes that mental states are high-level descriptions of simultaneous sub-neuronal, neuronal, and network-level computations. These levels are linked by non-causal supervenience, not causation; causality operates only within levels, not between them. The theory requires causality to satisfy three conditions: interventionist tests, same-level events, and a temporal order with a timescale of about 10 ms. While mental-level causal descriptions can be useful, brain-level accounts may be more accurate because mental-level accounts can involve confabulation. Cases of apparent downward causation are reinterpreted as within-level causation. This approach offers a path beyond Cartesian dualism and physical reductionism.
Frontiers in computational neuroscience
January 1, 2023
Diana Stanciu
5 citations
The new approach in cognitive science known as 4E cognition (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended) may revive certain Aristotelian concepts, particularly his notion of nature as an inner impulse to movement that is neither fully corporeal nor incorporeal, and his distinction between active and passive intellect. By analyzing Aristotle's definitions in Physics, On the Parts of Animals, and On the Soul, the author argues that the mind-body problem central to explaining consciousness can be partially eluded or transcended through a subtle account of causation. Recent neuroscience findings on consciousness could be better understood within a 4E cognition paradigm inspired by these Aristotelian views.