Consciousness and cognition
July 1, 2016
Josef Parnas, Mads Gram Henriksen
128 citations
Mysticism and schizophrenia, though distinct categories, share important phenomenological similarities that have been largely overlooked. This paper explores structural analogies between key features of mysticism and major clinical-phenomenological aspects of schizophrenia spectrum disorders, including attitudes, the nature of experience, and the experience of an 'other' reality. These features revolve around basic dimensions of consciousness and appear to involve a specific alteration of the structure of consciousness itself. This finding has implications for understanding consciousness and its psychopathological distortions.
Consciousness and cognition
September 1, 2019
Mads Gram Henriksen, Josef Parnas, Dan Zahavi
82 citations
In consciousness research, the authors defend experiential minimalism, the view that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a necessary, universal feature of all conscious experience. They refute claims that thought insertion in schizophrenia is a counterexample showing experiences without for-me-ness. Instead, they argue that thought insertion involves a disturbed, not absent, for-me-ness. The authors highlight unaddressed methodological and psychopathological problems in philosophical discussions of thought insertion and offer a novel account of how for-me-ness is disturbed in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, potentially contributing to the formation of thought insertion.
Psychopathology
January 1, 2021
Julie Nordgaard, Mads Gram Henriksen, Lennart Jansson et al.
52 citations
The concept of disordered selfhood in schizophrenia reemerged around the year 2000. In 2005, the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE) was published as a psychometric tool. This article traces the historical background of the EASE, explains the idea of a disorder of the basic or minimal self using phenomenological philosophy, and describes the clinical signs the EASE targets. The authors share their own experience using and teaching the EASE and review the empirical evidence gathered so far. They argue that basic self-disorder is a key phenotype of schizophrenia spectrum disorders, offering a path for empirical research into causes and for psychotherapeutic treatment.
Schizophrenia bulletin
May 25, 2025
Andrea Raballo, Mads Gram Henriksen, Michele Poletti et al.
9 citations
Self-disorders—non-psychotic anomalous self-experiences—cluster specifically in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, including familial high-risk groups. Over three decades, the concept has matured from clinical observations into a defined research domain. Self-disorders serve as a quantifiable trait phenotype for genetic liability and as a risk phenotype that precedes overt symptoms like schizotypal features and positive, negative, and disorganized symptoms. This framework offers insights into the nature of these conditions and holds promise for improving diagnostic accuracy, prognostic assessments, and intervention targets.
European archives of psychiatry and clinical neuroscience
April 1, 2026
Lars Siersbæk Nilsson, Julie Nordgaard, Mads Gram Henriksen et al.
5 citations
Poor insight in schizophrenia is linked to fundamental alterations in the structure of subjective experience, known as self-disorders, rather than to other symptoms or general intelligence. In a study of 67 patients with schizophrenia or non-affective psychosis in a non-acute phase, those with impaired insight had significantly higher levels of self-disorders than those with good insight, while positive, negative, and depressive symptoms did not differ between groups. Regression analyses showed that only self-disorders were significantly associated with impaired insight. These findings support the idea that self-disorders contribute to poor insight, which may inform early intervention and treatment.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
June 20, 2026
Søren Overgaard, Laura Oppi, Kasper Møller Nielsen et al.
Defining hallucination is surprisingly difficult: most definitions either miss cases that clinicians consider hallucinations or include cases they do not. This paper first shows why existing accounts fail, then develops a new definition that captures all and only the cases clinicians classify as hallucinations. The key is clarifying two often vague ideas: that hallucinations have a 'sense of reality' and that they are 'perception-like'. By specifying exactly what these mean, the authors provide an account that matches clinical usage.
Psychopathology
May 19, 2026
Barbara Kariž, Mads Gram Henriksen, Borut Škodlar
Visual art therapy structured by phenomenological insights helps people with schizophrenia explore themselves, articulate emotions, and build narrative identity. In a qualitative case study of 15 patients, twelve sessions of this approach fostered self-exploration, new perspectives, hope, interpersonal communication, and changed perceptions of others. Several patients identified personal challenges they could work on, showing the therapy's potential for supporting recovery and individualized care.
Psychopathology
April 27, 2026
Mads Gram Henriksen, Håvard Hovstad, Helena Cobanovic et al.
The Inventory of Psychotic-Like Anomalous Self-Experiences (IPASE), a self-report questionnaire, was compared with the semi-structured clinical interview Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE) in 41 participants (including patients with psychosis or schizotypal disorder, other mental disorders, and healthy controls). IPASE and EASE total scores were moderately correlated (Spearman's ρ = 0.54), sharing about 29% variance. Qualitative analysis revealed that IPASE item endorsements often reflected ordinary experiences, medication effects, or psychotic symptoms rather than the subtle self-disorders captured by the EASE. The results indicate that IPASE and EASE do not measure the same construct, raising serious doubts about IPASE's validity for assessing self-disorders and emphasizing the need for phenomenological interviewing.