Consciousness and cognition
September 1, 2019
Mads Gram Henriksen, Josef Parnas, Dan Zahavi
82 citations
In consciousness research, the authors defend experiential minimalism, the view that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a necessary, universal feature of all conscious experience. They refute claims that thought insertion in schizophrenia is a counterexample showing experiences without for-me-ness. Instead, they argue that thought insertion involves a disturbed, not absent, for-me-ness. The authors highlight unaddressed methodological and psychopathological problems in philosophical discussions of thought insertion and offer a novel account of how for-me-ness is disturbed in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, potentially contributing to the formation of thought insertion.
Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture
April 14, 2017
Dan Zahavi
71 citations
A self can be defined in many ways, but the author defends a minimal, experientially based conception of selfhood. Responding to objections from Ratcliffe, Ciaunica, and Fotopoulou, the author argues that the minimal self is not interpersonally constituted. The answer to whether it is viable to suggest interpersonal constitution is negative.
Psychopathology
January 1, 2021
Julie Nordgaard, Mads Gram Henriksen, Lennart Jansson et al.
52 citations
The concept of disordered selfhood in schizophrenia reemerged around the year 2000. In 2005, the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE) was published as a psychometric tool. This article traces the historical background of the EASE, explains the idea of a disorder of the basic or minimal self using phenomenological philosophy, and describes the clinical signs the EASE targets. The authors share their own experience using and teaching the EASE and review the empirical evidence gathered so far. They argue that basic self-disorder is a key phenotype of schizophrenia spectrum disorders, offering a path for empirical research into causes and for psychotherapeutic treatment.
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition
October 9, 2018
Dan Zahavi, John Michael
12 citations
The current debate on empathy suffers from a diversity of definitions and no consensus. This paper does not aim to resolve these disputes but instead explores the potential of applying embodied, extended, enactive, and embedded (4E) approaches to empathy research. These approaches integrate insights from phenomenology and cognitive sciences, highlighting the role of reciprocity, intentional alignment, embodied simulation, and the second-person perspective. They also challenge the widespread assumption that empathy amounts to affective matching or mirroring.
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
July 9, 2020
Dan Zahavi
9 citations
The debate about selfhood in philosophy of mind has recently shifted from questions of persistence over time (diachronic identity) to the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and selfhood in the present moment (synchronic identity). The central question is whether conscious experiences inherently involve or disclose a self, or whether, as Lichtenberg argued against Descartes, it is enough to say that experiences simply occur without positing an 'I'. The text outlines this shift and frames the disagreement without taking a definitive position.