The explanatory gap between functional and phenomenal consciousness—the 'hard problem'—remains unresolved. Dualists posit phenomenal consciousness as a primitive, private, non-reductive element; illusionists claim it is a cognitive illusion. Both views are flawed because they treat consciousness as an absolute, observer-independent property. A relativistic theory of consciousness is proposed: a system has or lacks phenomenal consciousness only relative to an observer. In the cognitive system's own frame of reference, consciousness is observable (first-person perspective); in another frame, it is not (third-person perspective). Neither perspective is privileged. Drawing on relativity physics, a mathematical formalization is developed that bridges the explanatory gap and dissolves the hard problem. Philosophers can contribute by collaborating with neuroscientists to explore the neural basis of phenomenal structures.
Consciousness may be a relative phenomenon, like motion in physics. The authors argue that the hard problem of consciousness—how neural activity creates subjective experience—remains unsolved because both dualist and illusionist views wrongly treat consciousness as an absolute property independent of an observer. They propose a relativistic theory: a cognitive system either has or does not have phenomenal consciousness relative to a particular observer. From the system's own frame of reference, consciousness is observable (first-person perspective); from another's frame, it is not. Neither perspective is privileged, as both describe the same underlying reality.