The explanatory gap between functional and phenomenal consciousness—the 'hard problem'—remains unresolved. Dualists posit phenomenal consciousness as a primitive, private, non-reductive element; illusionists claim it is a cognitive illusion. Both views are flawed because they treat consciousness as an absolute, observer-independent property. A relativistic theory of consciousness is proposed: a system has or lacks phenomenal consciousness only relative to an observer. In the cognitive system's own frame of reference, consciousness is observable (first-person perspective); in another frame, it is not (third-person perspective). Neither perspective is privileged. Drawing on relativity physics, a mathematical formalization is developed that bridges the explanatory gap and dissolves the hard problem. Philosophers can contribute by collaborating with neuroscientists to explore the neural basis of phenomenal structures.
Smooth coping—skillful, habituated action like walking, driving, or cooking—is characterized by rapidity and reduced cognitive load. The authors develop a conceptual model of smooth coping within the LIDA cognitive architecture, which implements global workspace theory. They argue that smooth coping consists of sequences of automatized actions intermittently interspersed with consciously mediated action selection, supplemented by never-conscious dorsal stream processes for online adjustments. To implement this, they introduce an Automatized Action Selection sub-module. The model integrates embodied intelligence from enactivism with representations and conscious control mechanisms, addressing how smooth coping can be modeled in autonomous agents and implemented in artificial agents.