Thought experiments about phenomenal consciousness have a legitimate and valuable role in philosophy. The paper first surveys the philosophical and scientific background of well-known mind-and-consciousness thought experiments, focusing on problems left unresolved by scientific theories and by attempts to reduce mind to the physical world. A case study of the zombie thought experiment shows how a simple, naive intuition generated complex arguments that have enriched philosophical and intellectual landscape. Overall, philosophy addresses properly philosophical questions about the mind and is not a junior partner to cognitive science.
A common-sense-based argument against physicalism regarding phenomenal consciousness is presented. The author contends that the widespread presupposition that a physicalist view of consciousness must be correct is not justified. The paper elaborates on a strong prima facie case for rejecting physicalism, grounded in common sense, arguing that the nature or essence of conscious experience cannot be fully captured by physical descriptions. This challenges the assumption that consciousness is entirely physical, suggesting that ordinary intuitions provide compelling reasons to doubt materialism.