Current opinion in neurobiology
April 1, 2015
Sina Fazelpour, Evan Thompson
64 citations
Recent research on spontaneous brain rhythms and neural network coordination supports Immanuel Kant's concept of cognitive spontaneity—the mind's ability to organize sensory input in new ways. However, linking brain activity to cognition precisely remains difficult. Neurophenomenology, which incorporates subjective experience to explain variations in brain dynamics, provides a promising approach to this problem.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume
January 1, 2003
Robert Hanna, Evan Thompson
48 citations
Consciousness makes the mind-body problem especially difficult to solve. Our failure to understand the relationship between mind and body suggests that current concepts are inadequate and require development. Mind can be understood as a spatiotemporal pattern that shapes the brain's metastable dynamic patterns.
January 1, 2015
Evan Thompson, J. Windt
17 citations
A debate in classical Indian philosophy between Advaita Vedānta and Yoga, which held that consciousness is present in dreamless sleep, and the Nyāya school, which held it is absent, challenges the standard neuroscientific definition of consciousness as that which disappears in dreamless sleep and reappears upon waking or dreaming. The reasoning used by Advaita Vedānta to rebut the Nyāya view offers new resources for contemporary philosophy of mind. Findings from cognitive neuroscience have implications for Indian debates about cognition during sleep and for discussions of the self and its relationship to the body. The Indian materials suggest a need for a more refined taxonomy of sleep states than sleep science currently employs, and that contemplative mind training is relevant for advancing the neurophenomenology of sleep and consciousness.
November 6, 2017
Jelena Markovic, Evan Thompson
1 citation
A necessary first step in collaboration between hypnosis research and meditation research is clarification of key concepts. The authors propose that such clarification is best advanced by neurophenomenological investigations integrating neuroscience methods with phenomenological models based on first-person reports. Focusing on absorption, they argue that previous treatments of hypnosis and meditation as equivalent are incorrect, but they can be fruitfully compared when characteristic features of the states are examined. Using the phenomenological and neurocognitive matrix of mindfulness (PNM), they compare focused attention meditation and open monitoring meditation with hypnosis across its dimensions, interpreting empirical research on hypnosis and shedding light on debates about meta-awareness in hypnosis and the role of suggestion in meditation.
The Embodied Mind
January 13, 2017
Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch
1 citation
Cognition depends on having a body with sensorimotor capacities, which are embedded in broader biological, psychological, and cultural contexts. Sensory and motor processes are fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition and have evolved together. The enactive approach holds that perception consists of perceptually guided action and that cognitive structures emerge from recurrent sensorimotor patterns enabling such guidance.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
March 23, 2026
Evan Thompson
The author replies to commentaries on the book The Blind Spot, which argues that science must account for human experience rather than pretend to an objective view from nowhere. The response engages with points raised by Chirimuuta, Froese, Kyselo, and Vanney, defending the book's critique of reductionism and its call for a science that incorporates first-person experience and sense-making. The author maintains that ignoring the subjective, embodied dimension of knowing creates a blind spot that undermines scientific understanding.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2026
Sneha K S Sheth, Mike Doswell, Kalina Christoff Hadjiilieva et al.
Over the past 25 years, neuroscience has focused on perceptual consciousness, but the dynamic experience of the stream of thought—first described by William James—has received less attention. The Dynamic Framework of Thought (DFT) provides a taxonomy of thought dynamics. This study used four experiments, including laboratory, online, and fMRI-based settings, to test whether people can introspectively access and distinguish two thought dimensions: freely moving and deliberately directed. In all experiments, participants reported their thought dynamics during a probed resting period with eyes open. Using mixed methods, the findings suggest that individuals have some introspective access to these dynamics.
November 15, 2017
Evan Thompson
This commentary engages with Dan Arnold's book, which examines the problem of intentionality—the aboutness of mental states—as it appears in classical Buddhist philosophy and contemporary cognitive science. The author discusses Arnold's argument that Buddhist thinkers, particularly Dharmakīrti, offer a distinctive perspective on intentionality that challenges reductive physicalist accounts in modern philosophy of mind. The commentary explores how taking Buddhist philosophy of mind seriously can illuminate debates about mental representation, causation, and the nature of belief, suggesting that cross-cultural philosophical dialogue enriches our understanding of these foundational issues.
Evan Thompson
Neurophenomenology combines first-person accounts of experience with third-person neuroscientific data to study contemplative practices. The chapter explains how this approach can deepen understanding of meditative states and their effects on consciousness, and discusses its implications for dialogues between science and religion. By integrating subjective reports with brain measurements, neurophenomenology offers a rigorous method for exploring the nature of mind and experience that bridges empirical science and contemplative traditions.