The article argues that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy supports integrating transcendental phenomenology with empirical science, contrary to the claim that they are fundamentally separate. The author proposes an "Integrationist View" where consciousness is understood as a structure of behavior that precedes the distinction between objective and subjective, and first- and third-person perspectives. On this view, the transcendental is not separate from science but consists of contingent organizational norms of empirical nature, best illuminated through dialogue between phenomenological and scientific approaches. Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the Schneider case is presented as an example of this integration.
This article argues that art transforms everyday experience through symbolic communication, rejecting both the idea that art is entirely separate from daily life and the notion that it is directly continuous with it. Drawing on the enactive concept of humans as linguistic bodies and the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, the authors propose that art is a linguistic phenomenon enabling original situations of communication. They discuss and critique enactivist perspectives from Shaun Gallagher and Alva Noë, then develop a pluralistic view of art media and a conception of art and art experience as modes of ideational, embodied thought.